






















Centre for Research in Applied Economics, 
School of Economics and Finance 
Curtin Business School 
Curtin University of Technology 





    
A Simple Spatial Model for Edgeworth Cycles 
 
Nick WILLS-JOHNSON* 
Centre for Research in Applied Economics 
Curtin University of Technology 
GPO Box U1987 
Perth, Western Australia 6845 
email: n.wills-johnson@aciltasman.com.au 
 tel: +61894499616 
fax: +61893223955 
Harry Bloch 
Centre for Research in Applied Economics 
Curtin University of Technology 
GPO Box U1987 
Perth, Western Australia 6845 




JEL Codes: C65, L13, L81 
Keywords: Edgeworth Cycles, spatial markets 
 
Abstract 
Maskin & Tirole (1998) formalise Edgeworth’s (1925) model of a dynamic equilibrium 
between two players where prices increase sharply and decrease slowly; the Edgeworth 
Cycle.  Here, we present an application of the model, showing how Edgeworth Cycles 
might arise in a marketplace where spatial competition s important.  We illustrate the 
approach using the example of retail gasoline markets where Edgeworth Cycles have 
been widely observed. 
 
* Corresponding author 
A Simple Spatial Model for Edgeworth Cycles 
Maskin & Tirole (1988) formalise the suggestion of Edgeworth (1925) of a regular cycle 
of prices in an oligopoly.  Many of the assumptions made by Maskin & Tirole (1988) are 
relaxed by in subsequent work. Noel (2007a), shows that such cycles still occur when 
marginal costs, elasticities, product and strategies d ffer and when there are three firms. 
Eckert (2003) shows that they obtain when the firms are different sizes and Lau (2001), 
shows how cycles can arise even when players move simultaneously.  There has also 
been considerable empirical work exploring the nature of Edgeworth Cycles in retail 
gasoline markets in Canada (Eckert & West, 2004a,b, 2005, Atkinson, Eckert & West, 
2009, Noel, 2007a, b), the US (Lewis, 2008 and Doyle, Muehlegger & Samphantharak, 
2008) and Australia (Wang, 2009, ACCC, 2007, Wills-Johnson & Bloch, 2010a, b). 
. 
Figure One about here 
 
We further extend the analysis by deriving Edgeworth Cycles in a spatial model. This is 
appropriate given the importance of spatial competition in gasoline markets where they 
are commonly observed.  Our analysis is based on a simple framework in order to 
emphasise its intuitive appeal. 
The Model 
The model is based upon the work of Hoover (1937) and MacBride (1983), who show 
how firms price discriminate between customers, charging closer customers higher prices 
than those more distant as closer customers face high r costs in accessing the firm in a 
spatially differentiated market.  Our point of departure from their models is to assume 
that customers come to the firm (rather than having goods delivered to them), which 
means that the firm cannot ascertain from whence its customers have come and must thus 
charge a single price to all of them. 
 
Consider the situation of two firms, A and B, located along a section of road, and selling 
an homogenous product to consumers who purchase one unit ach of the product. The 
uniformly distributed consumers each have a travel plan that takes them past one of the 
retailers but they would have to deviate to frequent the premises of the other retailer.  
They would only choose to deviate if the second retailer had prices lower than the retailer 
they plan to pass (and can thus patronise at zero cost) by a margin greater than the extra 
travel costs of deviating.  Each retailer maximises profit by trading off the extra per-unit 
profits that can be made by charging higher prices to those consumers for whom 
deviating to the competing retailer is costly against the extra gross profits which can be 
made by selling to more customers if a retailer undercuts its rival.   
The situation faced by the firms is illustrated in F gure 2, where the cross-hatched shaded 
area indicates the profit Firm A gains from expanding market share through its lower 
price and the diagonally marked shaded area indicates the profit it loses on its most 
captive customers by not pricing at the same level as Firm B.   
 
Figure Two about here 
 
Assuming that consumers’ planned departure points from the highway are uniformly 
distributed along the road between the two firms, the profit function of each firm can be 
expressed as 
( ) ( )
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where: 
pi = price charged by firm i.
qi = proportion of overall customers that pass firm  first. 
ci = marginal cost of firm i. 
d = distance between firm i and firm j. 
tanα = the per-unit cost of travel (cost/distance). 
 
Consider a sequential game where Firm A moves first and sets a price p*, which is above 
an as yet undefined minimum.  If m and q are, respectively, the travel cost and number of 
customers whose travel plans take them past Firm A and n and r represent the same 






 ++= *2 tan2
1,min qprdnqqmpp α       (2) 
 
The best response to this price, when Firm A responds i  turn, will be: 
 




 +++++= *222 22tan4
1,min pnmqrrqdqrmpp α    (3) 
 
The process continues until each firm reaches a minimum, below which it will not go.  
This minimum is: 
 




 +++= qrnmdrqqrmpp 2tan23
1,min 222 α  for Firm A,  
and           (4) 




 +++= qrnmdrqqrmpp 2tan23
1,min 222 α  for Firm B. 
 
The question is whether the firms will move from this minimum.  Raising price, as 
Maskin & Tirole (1988) suggest is a “public good” in that one firm doing so provides 
benefits both firms by raising the price that must be beaten to capture market share.  A 
firm might decide to be the first mover if it believes that its rival will do so the next time 
they both reach a minimum, or if its own marginal costs and share of customers whose 
travel plans take them past it are such that it can gai  profits over the course of the cycle 
(compared to both firms remaining at the minimum) even if it moves first.   
 
However, the incentive to raise price need not be related to having the lowest costs, the 
most customers or an expectation of future moves.  Consider the case where m=n and 
q=r, and Firm A again increases its price to p*. The best response of Firm B is now: 
 
 
( )*2 tan21 pdp += α         (5) 
 
The best response of Firm A to B’s best response is: 
 
( )*2 tan341 pdp += α         (6) 
 
This continues until each firm reaches its minimum price: 
 
( )αtan2dp =           (7) 
 
In this case, the profit for each firm if both remain t this minimum price is: 
 
απ tan3qdi =          (8) 
 
The profits for each firm if Firm B relents first are shown in Table 1 overleaf, where the 
shaded cells indicate who is moving in which round.  Note that p* is now p ; the 
maximum price that is feasible for this particular outlet.  Subsequent responses to Firm 
B’s increase in price are all a function of the distance between the two firms, the cost of 
travel and the price to which Firm B raises, not the minimum price.  Thus, to maximise 
its returns over the cycle, Firm B will raise its price as high as it can. 
 
 
Table One about here 
 
Table One shows that there will clearly be cases where cycling gives higher profits than 
both firms remaining at the minimum price.  However, the profit functions are complex.  
To simplify matters still further, we consider the results over a range of 
prices αδ tan2dp ×= , where δ is a simple scalar mark-up over the minimum price.  The 
results are shown in Table Two, over the same five rounds as in Table One.   
 
Table Two about here 
For Firm A, which does not initiate the price hike, n t profits are an increasing function 
of the size of the price hike.  This is because it can capture a large profit in Round One, 
by pricing just below Firm B, but it does not have a compensating loss in Round Zero 
from a price hike which loses market share.  Firm B, however, is different.  When the 
price hike reaches roughly twice the minimum, its net profits turn negative.  It thus seems 
unlikely that firms will raise prices above this level, even if the optimal response of a 
market-wide monopolist would be to do so. 
Conclusions 
This paper introduces a very simple spatial model that is intuitively reasonable in the 
context of a market like that of retail gasoline.  Whilst not proving that Edgeworth Cycles 
obtain in every case, like Noel (2007a), it suggests that they are highly likely over a wide 
range of plausible scenarios.  Moreover, it shows that one does not need differences in 
costs or in market share (measured by customers passing an outlet first) in order to 
provide a unilateral incentive to increase price.  This may help in explaining why 
Edgeworth Cycles are widely observed in retail gasoline markets. 
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Cost of travel to A 
Cost of travel to B 
 
Table 1 
Four-round game results 
 Best Response Price Profits 
 Firm A Firm B Firm A Firm B 
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Net profits over a range of multiples of minimum price equilibria 
δ Net Profit for Firm A Net Profit for Firm B 
1.1 0.2576d3tanα 0.1103d3tanα 
1.2 0.2576d3tanα 0.1103d3tanα 
1.3 0.5178d3tanα 0.1914d3tanα 
1.4 0.7807d3tanα 0.2432d3tanα 
1.5 1.0462d3tanα 0.2656d3tanα 
1.6 1.3144d3tanα 0.2588d3tanα 
1.7 1.5853d3tanα 0.2226d3tanα 
1.8 1.8588d3tanα 0.1572d3tanα 
1.9 2.1350d3tanα 0.0625d3tanα 
2.0 2.4138d3tanα -0.0615d3tanα 
2.1 2.6953d3tanα -0.2148d3tanα 
 
 
 
 
 
